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ral Histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. John E. Shepherd was the Special
Advisor for Modeling at the Center for
Army Analysis. The interview was con-
ducted on October 14, 2011 with Mr. John
Shepherd and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, in
Fairfax, Virginia; participating via telephone
were Mr. Bill Dunn, FS, and Mr. Mike
Garrambone.
Bob Sheldon: This is a MORS Oral His-
tory interview with John Shepherd, and
we’re here in Fairfax, Virginia on October
14, 2011. John, first of all, tell me your par-
ents’ names.
John Shepherd: My parents’ names were
Elizabeth and Harry Shepherd.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us a little bit about your
parents and how they influenced you.
John Shepherd: My mother was an
only child. She attended a New England
college—I don’t recall the name. She was
an artist and worked for Johns Hopkins
University Medical School where she did
illustrations of surgery for textbooks. She
told me photography back in the early
1930s was pretty bad, and the surgeons
always wanted the clamps in a different
place than they really would have them,
so she did color drawings for textbooks.
My father worked for Scripps Howard
newspaper syndicate and for the Baltimore
Sun, and that’s how they met.
I don’t know that they ever pushed me
in any direction. My mother was very much
into art, so when I was six years old I took
tap and ballet and started to play the trum-
pet and the piano. My brother and sister
went through the same. When I was about
seven, my parents decided to get a divorce
so I was shipped off to Augusta Military
Academy, where my mother assured me
I would learn things that would serve me
well in my life; and I did. I learned how
to take an M-1 Garand rifle apart and put
it back together while blindfolded in less
than four minutes. I wrote my mother and
told her this. She wrote me back and cau-
tioned me about sarcasms.
Bill Dunn: Where is Augusta Military
Academy?
John Shepherd: It’s in Fort Defiance,
Virginia. It’s between Harrisonburg and
Stanton, Virginia. I played trumpet in the
band company. Everyone wanted to be in
the band company because they practiced
in a large room while the rest of the corps
marched from about 3:00 until 4:00 p.m.
I was constantly teaching people how to
read music and play musical instruments;
many of the instruments I had never played.
Even the band instructor couldn’t read
music. He was hired as a faculty member
to teach English, but his secondary job was
standing in front of us with a baton and
waving it back and forth.
Bob Sheldon: Did you ever tell E. B.
Vandiver you knew how to tap dance?
John Shepherd: No.
Bill Dunn: And ballet.
John Shepherd: And ballet. All I remem-
ber was, ‘‘Shuffle, shuffle, click, shuffle, shuf-
fle, click.’’ These are movements you make
with your feet. It’s better when you’re six.
If you’re eight or nine, you’re the only guy
in the class with a bunch of eight- or nine-
year-old girls; it’s humiliating.
How did that influence me to go into
mathematics and chemistry? I don’t
know.
Bob Sheldon: What years did you attend
the Augusta Military Academy?
John Shepherd: Probably third and fourth
grades. I was there two years. I don’t re-
member a lot about it except it was where
I became interested in amateur radio. They
had military radios, walkie-talkies, and I
was fascinated with them; I learned to take
them apart and put them together, and fix
them, and calibrate them. That may have
influenced me later in life understanding
electronics. I think when I was 11 or 12, I
did pass the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) exam to get my general class
amateur radio license.
My mother remarried and we moved to
a small town in the Ozarks, not far from
where Mr. Vandiver grew up, believe it or
not—Cabool, Missouri—where I would run
my amateur radio station. Television (TV)
had just come in. We were 75 miles from
the local transmitter and we had the only
TV set in town. The three doctors in town
lived on either side of us and across the
street, and they’d come over and watch
television, particularly baseball games. Af-
ter one of the docs purchased his TV set,























Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012, doi 10.5711/10825983173135 Page 135
transmitter during baseball games because the
signal would wipe out the TV reception.
When my mother later divorced, I came east
to live with my grandparents and attended
Annandale High School in Virginia. My class-
mates included Creighton Abrams Jr.; Jay Scully,
who later became Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Research, Development and Acquisi-
tion; and Jim Clapper. Jim was dating the lady
who later became and has been my wife for
the past 50 years. Jim, like so many military
dependents, moved when his father was trans-
ferred. As chance would have it, I met Jim’s fa-
ther many years later in a meeting at Arlington
Hall.
Bill Dunn: That’s Lieutenant General Clap-
per you’re talking about?
John Shepherd: Yes. The irony of the whole
thing is many years later my wife was sitting
on a bus from CIA headquarters to an office in
Rosslyn, Virginia. Two women seated next to
her were talking about General Clapper. My
wife commented she had gone steady with Jim
in high school.
This story gets even better because when
Jim returned to his office at Bolling Air Force
Base in Washington, DC, one of these women
who was a secretary said, ‘‘Oh, we ran into your
high school sweetheart,’’ whereupon the story
goes, he retrieved his high school yearbook
and the secretary said, ‘‘She hasn’t changed a
bit.’’ So Jim called—or his secretary called—my
wife on Monday and said, ‘‘General Clapper
would like to take you to lunch,’’ and my wife
said, ‘‘Well, you tell General Clapper if he wants
to take me to lunch, he should call me.’’ About
10 minutes later he called—he was laughing—
and they did go to lunch.
Bob Sheldon: Did you take a lot of math and
science courses in Annandale High School?
John Shepherd: I did. I took most of what they
offered. One of the interesting stories is one of
my classmates, Creighton Abrams Jr., was in
my Algebra II class, and the instructor—I think
Mr. Eckles was his name—stopped me in the
hall one day and said, ‘‘Abrams’ dad was up
here. He’s a one-star general and he’s complain-
ing that we’re not getting enough homework
in algebra and I don’t know what to do.’’ I said,
‘‘It’s very simple: you let Abrams work all the
problems at the end of every chapter, and the
rest of us will continue to work the even or the
odd, whatever you want.’’ So I said over the
years, if Creighton was any good in math, it
was my fault.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you graduate
from Annandale?
John Shepherd: 1958.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to college?
John Shepherd: I had some scholarship of-
fers, but they were all the land-grant schools.
In those days, you had to go in the Corps of
Cadets for the first two years. Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) came after me pretty hard; some
admiral who graduated from there drove me
down to Lexington, Virginia. They wanted a
basketball player, which I had been in high
school but I wasn’t that good. My high school
assistant principal had graduated from a small
college in Eastern Kentucky called Union Col-
lege, and he said, ‘‘I’m going to go down there
and do a little fishing this summer. Why don’t
you go with me and let’s look it over?’’ It was
perfect. Twelve hundred students, small cam-
pus, I loved it.
Bob Sheldon: What was your major?
John Shepherd: Math and a minor in chemis-
try—I almost had a major in chemistry. I think
I had a minor in theology. Now that may sound
strange, but theology and philosophy fascinated
me. I wandered off and took a lot of courses
in theology and discovered that perhaps much
of theology is predicated on some fairly weak
evidence, which when you’re young can really
challenge your beliefs. You really have to be
careful and have somebody, a good professor,
who can help you get back on track. I loved
chemistry. It’s just the labs were forever and ever.
Bill Dunn: Let me clarify something. You
went to Union College, or you went to Eastern
Kentucky University?
John Shepherd: Union College. We played
Eastern Kentucky—Eastern was one of our bas-
ketball rivals.
Bob Sheldon: Did you play basketball at
Union College?
John Shepherd: A little bit, but never varsity.
Bob Sheldon: You had a math major; I assume
you took the standard array of abstract math
and matrix algebra and differential equations?
John Shepherd: Yes, calculus, differential
equations, vector and tensor analysis, dot and
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cross products; I loved it. I guess there were 10
hours of calculus. I took four hours of differen-
tial equations. Theory of equations was a course
I never quite understood.
Bob Sheldon: What was your first job after
graduation?
John Shepherd: I’d broken my left arm. I was
actually going to go in the Navy and become
a pilot, but my arm wouldn’t heal. During the
surgery my arm became infected, so most of
the bone marrow was destroyed. To this day
I have a plate and a bunch of screws that hold
it together.
Bob Sheldon: How did you break your arm?
John Shepherd: Playing intramural basket-
ball.
Bob Sheldon: So that kept you out of the
Navy?
John Shepherd: Yes, it kept me out of the
Navy. Then I took the Federal Service Entrance
Exam. This sounds awfully gauche, but I scored
well on it. I received a letter from the White
House saying I’d been nominated as a presiden-
tial intern, appointee, or something. Kennedy
was President.
I was in the Pentagon being interviewed,
and a lady said to me as I was leaving the office,
‘‘There’s a new outfit in Bethesda, Maryland,
called the US Army Strategy and Tactics Analy-
sis Group (STAG), and I think you’d fit well
there. I’ll give them your number.’’ I said, ‘‘Fine.’’
I’d hardly gotten home when COL Alfred W.
DeQuoy called me and said, ‘‘I’d like to see you
this evening.’’ He sent me to COL Fisher’s
house in Edsall Park, Virginia, where I was
interviewed, and I said, ‘‘Great.’’ I didn’t know
what a model was; he’s talking about models,
and I thought well, they’re females in bathing
suits or they’re things that have wings and
propellers.
That Monday I literally carpooled with COL
Fisher and a fellow by the name of Jim Hurd,
who was a very talented computer programmer.
The first place they sent me was to American
University in Washington, DC, to take a course
in linear programming.
Bob Sheldon: That was 1962?
John Shepherd: The fall or summer of 1962.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
work on at STAG? Did you call it STAG at the
time?
John Shepherd: They called it STAG. The first
job I had was to figure out what FORTRAN’s all
about. I’d been programming, like everybody
else, in machine-level language and STAG had
taken delivery of an IBM 7090.
Bob Sheldon: Had you taken any computer
classes in college?
John Shepherd: I hadn’t had a one.
Bob Sheldon: So you learned about com-
puters at STAG?
John Shepherd: Yes. I got a book from IBM on
FORTRAN and I had another book on assembly
language. I think I donated them to the Army
OR library Van had created at CAA. In any
event, IBM gave me a magnetic tape, no hard
drives, that had the assembler and a compiler
on it. COL Fisher said, ‘‘I want you to figure
out what this FORTRAN thing is.’’ I worked
with it for a few months and realized in going
through the machine-level language code in
the compiler that I could improve things, and
since nobody told me not to, I rewrote it. This
got me in trouble. David Taylor Model Basin
people would come out to STAG and use our
computer occasionally, and they noted that our
7090 was three times faster than theirs, so they
called IBM. IBM went to the David Taylor com-
plex and said, ‘‘There’s nothing wrong with
your computer,’’ and then they came to STAG
and they said, ‘‘There’s nothing wrong with
your computer.’’ Then David Taylor people
said, ‘‘Watch this,’’ and they ran their programs
on our computer and had the same programs
run on their computer. IBM said, ‘‘Somebody’s
modified the loader and the compiler.’’ They
went to Jim Hurd who was my supervisor at
STAG, who said, ‘‘I think I know who that might
have been,’’ so I got called on the carpet and told
you’re not supposed to take products we buy
from IBM and modify them.
The other part of the story is John Backus,
who I didn’t know at the time. He was a famous
person out in California and the developer of
FORTRAN. John called one day and said,
‘‘I want to come out and talk to you.’’ I showed
him what I did to the compiler, the loader, and
everything else.
The Army signed a letter of agreement, and
I had to sign it too, that IBM could market the
compiler we had at STAG. Backus told me the
following story: I was showing him some code
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that was in the compiler that was really bad, and
I didn’t realize who he was or I would have
never said this to him. I said, ‘‘You guys really
weren’t thinking.’’ When you’re 22 years old,
you make such statements. He said he and an-
other guy had come up with this idea for this
compiler and they had presented it to a vice
president of IBM, who thought this is a great
idea! And Backus said, ‘‘On Monday morning
I came to work and I had 34 people assigned
to me. I had no experience in managing 34
people, so God knows what went into the com-
piler.’’ Anyhow, that was my first job at STAG.
I also wrote software to drive the war
rooms. STAG had these huge screens, and
COL DeQuoy was one of those thinkers. He
would go to the Pentagon and convince them
to give him millions. We had a red war room,
a blue war room, and a control room, each with
big cathode ray tubes (CRTs) which captured on
film the tactical location of all military units.
Then projectors in the war rooms instantly de-
veloped and projected the tactical units’ loca-
tions onto these huge screens that were 30 feet
square. The Controller’s war room had a bal-
cony for the VIPs (very important persons). I
wrote most of the software to drive all of that.
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration) was curious about the soft-
ware to drive the screens. They asked me to
write some software in 1962 or 1963 that simu-
lated a moon rover that had a multisecond de-
lay from the time you push the button to have
it stop or go, or go left or go right; we were
using our terminals at STAG to simulate the
moon rover running over terrain using a light-
pen to guide it’s direction and speed.
Bob Sheldon: Where was STAG located? Was
it at the same place as CAA (at that time called
the Concepts Analysis Agency) in Bethesda?
John Shepherd: Yes, but there was only the
one building there. When I went to work there,
the parking lot was just a gravel lot, and you
parked anywhere you wanted. There was no
charge for parking. The Beltway had not opened
yet, but we used it at risk of getting a ticket; and
because some of it was still dirt, you didn’t drive
it when it rained. The Cabin John Bridge was in.
Prior to that we drove through Arlington on
Wilson Boulevard, and across Key Bridge and
out Foxhall Road by Embassy Row, and picked
up Wisconsin Avenue; and that’s how you got
to work. There wasn’t as much traffic in 1962,
not nearly as much.
Bill Dunn: Why did they choose that loca-
tion in the first place? I always was curious
how it got established in Bethesda.
John Shepherd: I was told COL DeQuoy,
who was then a staff officer with the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), started
STAG, and he lived in Bethesda. The Rugby
Building may have been built for STAG on
a long-term General Services Administration
(GSA) lease.
Bob Sheldon: In 1963, what other projects did
you work on, after you impressed them with
your computer skills?
John Shepherd: I didn’t stay long. It became
abundantly apparent to me after about two
years that there was a lot more money to be
made. My wife had graduated from college
and we had found out we were going to be par-
ents. I went in as a GS-7, got a 9 in six months,
got an 11 in six months, and then COL DeQuoy
went downtown to try to get a 12 for me. Well,
they wouldn’t give it to him. I think an 11 paid
$8,900 or something like that a year. My wife
started teaching school that year and she was
making $9,900 a year on a 9-month contract. I
kept saying to myself, ‘‘There’s something wrong
here.’’ The Planning Research Corporation (PRC)
had a spy someplace in STAG who said, ‘‘Why
don’t you have dinner with us one night at the
Golden Parrot?’’ which was a nice restaurant on
Connecticut Avenue. I think they offered me
$12,000 or $13,000, and I said, ‘‘Great.’’
My first job with PRC was doing code
encryptions/decryptions for the Navy in a win-
dowless building in Washington, DC. My com-
puter ran off batteries; it was in a room that
was electronically sealed against the rest of the
world, and I had carts filled with batteries. If
the batteries in one cart got low, I rolled it down
the hall and got another cart. I had three other
carts connected in series. I had a young, armed
Marine follow me around everywhere. He never
smiled; I always worried about that guy. Any-
how, that was my first job at PRC. I worked night
and day. I’d go home and help Mary Ina (my
wife) bathe our baby and put him to bed, and
then I’d have dinner and I’d drive back over in
town and work—you did that in those days.
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Bob Sheldon: What kinds of programs did
you write?
John Shepherd: A lot of the software came
from the National Security Agency (NSA), and
then we were developing some. I probably can’t
go any further. I had a debriefing that lasted
an entire afternoon and said, ‘‘By order of the
President, you’ll be shot if you ever tell anybody
about this.’’ But they (NSA) would bring tapes
down—this is before disks—and this car would
come with these people that had guns. They
would bring the tapes upstairs, and I would
sign for them.
Bob Sheldon: How many years did you work
for PRC?
John Shepherd: Two or three years. It was
a good company. The Research Analysis Corpo-
ration (RAC) had moved from Bethesda to
McLean, Virginia. A friend of mine was work-
ing for The MITRE Corporation, also in McLean,
and he convinced me I should go to work for
MITRE. Another friend worked at RAC and
set up an interview at RAC. Both MITRE and
RAC were good interviews. Both wanted to
know more about the inner workings of how
to program a CRT. I had good feelings about
both, but RAC’s new building and setup
impressed me and they asked ‘‘When can you
start work? I’m going to offer you the follow-
ing.’’ I said, ‘‘Wow, okay.’’ So I went to work
for RAC, and it was a good choice. It was like
a university.
Bob Sheldon: That would have been in the
late 1960s?
John Shepherd: It was 1965, 1966, somewhere
in there. Wilbur Payne was there, Dick Lester;
Lewis Leake, a lot of the people you’ve already
talked to.
Bill Dunn: Did you know Lewis Leake?
John Shepherd: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: You guys co-authored a paper,
didn’t you?
John Shepherd: They wrote it—Dr. Tiede and
Lew Leake. My name was on the paper because
I wrote the software. But they wrote the paper
that won the MORS Prize; I’ve forgotten what
year it was. It was on the Advice II model. It
was a computer-assisted wargame, and it had
these big CRTs with light pens and everything,
and I wrote all the software. It was on a Control
Data 1700, a little computer.
Yes, Lew was a joy to work with. Also
there were Dr. Tiede, General Whipple, COL
Fornoy, and COL Seibert. The joke was that
RAC stood for the ‘‘Retired Army Command.’’
[Laughs]
It was really great. They had a theater group
that was like the thespians. On weekends, a lot
of times they’d have first run movies in the
auditorium, which were free. It was a real non-
profit company. I’d take my son there—he was
probably three or four years old. The Army
would bring in helicopters and all the kids
could look at them and sit in the seats. We had
a windsock and a little control tower down at
the end of the parking lot.
The best job I ever had. I worked with Tony
Fiacco and Garth McCormick. They were writ-
ing a book on nonlinear programming and they
wanted somebody to write the software. I got
tapped to go with these two guys, and they were
lots of fun to work with. I remember when Tony
Fiacco got married. I think he’d gone to Italy
and met this really gorgeous lady, and I went
to Tony’s for dinner one night with a bunch of
other people.
RAC was where we built the Concepts Eval-
uation Model (CEM), although we originally
called it TCM—Theater Combat Model.
Bob Sheldon: Talk about the genesis of CEM.
You were on the ground floor.
John Shepherd: Yes. At RAC you could take
off and do rotational assignments, and I’d taken
a one-year rotational assignment to work with
Marion Bryson at ISA; Phil Schneider, who had
come from Duke with Marion Bryson; COL
Hazeltine; and COL Bob Lum (Bob had a PhD
in OR). Seymour Goldberg and Rex Brew were
also there. We were programming DYNTACS
(Dynamic Tactical Simulator), which was a model
being developed by Gordon Clark and Sam
Parry at Ohio State. I always brag I put Sam Parry
through graduate school.
Bill Dunn: What was ISA?
John Shepherd: The Institute for Systems
Analysis. It was a very small outfit, probably
didn’t have more than 50 people in an old build-
ing on post at Fort Belvoir.
Bob Sheldon: Where was that building phys-
ically located?
John Shepherd: I was told it was the World
War II Women’s Army Corps (WAC) barracks
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on Fort Belvoir. It was not far from the post the-
ater and the main Corps of Engineers building.
They have a big parade ground in front of that
old main Corps of Engineers building—same
road where you go to the Officer’s Club. We
were back about a block in the woods.
It had clotheslines out back. It had a very
antiquated phone system. Being a ham operator,
you study these things and one summer I had
a job in the building (I can’t tell you where), that
controlled all the phones for the East Coast, or
at least at that time. They were all mechanically
switched then. So I learned a lot about how the
phone system worked.
The phone guy was there one day working
on ISA’s phones and he had the big door open
on the cabinet and I’m standing there looking
at it and I said, ‘‘Oh, this is a such-and-such.’’
He said, ‘‘How do you know about that?’’ I said,
‘‘I worked over in such-and-such for Mr. So-
and-So.’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ Well, ISA had it so that Marion
Bryson and then Colonel Hazeltine and others
had phones that if they picked up the receiver,
they would get an outside line. But the rest of
us had to wait until it was free to get a dial tone.
They could preempt our phone calls just by
picking up the receiver, and if there were no
other outside lines, it dropped you. I realized
in looking at the switching network that if I
dialed two or three digits, I always got priority
on the phone.
Phil Schneider one day was trying to reach
his wife and he couldn’t get an outside line
and I said, ‘‘I will get you one.’’ So I grabbed
my phone and dialed these three digits and I
got a dial tone and I said, ‘‘Here.’’ Then he said,
‘‘How do you do that?’’ I said, ‘‘You really don’t
want to know.’’ So it turned out Marion Bryson
was on the phone when he got preempted by
Phil Schneider. Marion came down and wanted
to know how to do it—and I said, ‘‘It turns out
there are three digits. Don’t you dare ever tell
anybody what are the three digits.’’
Working for Marion Bryson was just super.
They all were. DYNTACS was a lot of fun. It was
during the campus unrest, so when colonels
would go with me to Ohio State—this was where
we were programming DYNTACS—I would ask
them not to put on their uniform. Things were
kind of touchy. One of them insisted on wear-
ing his uniform, and we had a little thing on
the elevator in the building on campus one
day. I got off on one floor and said, ‘‘That’s it,’’
walked up to Gordon Clark’s office on the next
floor and I said, ‘‘I don’t know whether the cam-
pus police are going to be here or not, but we’ve
had a little incident on the elevator between
COL So-and-So and a couple of students.’’ Just
the wrong time to be in a uniform on campus.
I left that job and went back to RAC. Jack
Newman had called and said, ‘‘We’re building
this model called TCM (Theater Combat Model),
and Joe Bruner wants you back here to work on
it.’’ I said, ‘‘Great,’’ so I told Marion Bryson,
‘‘I’m no longer a Seagull; I’m going to go back
to being a nonprofit guy.’’ I went back and started
writing code. Bruner and Phil Louer were just
great, you can’t say enough about their capabil-
ities. All I did was write code, but really Bruner
was the guiding light and Phil Louer was the
man who kept us all steering in the right direc-
tion. You need somebody like Phil; programmers
tend to wander off. Phil was just incredible. I
loved working for him, working with him.
As I recall, TCM was sponsored by the Of-
fice of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army, LTG Bill DePuy, and was to be a replace-
ment for the RAC ATLAS (A Tactical, Logistical,
and Air Simulation) Theater Model. I think it
was adopted by CAA in 1973 to perform the
CONAF Study (Conceptual Design of the Army
in the Field). CEM originally stood for CONAF
Evaluation Model. Later it was changed to Con-
cepts Evaluation Model. Many years later, while
trying to clean out my garage, I found an origi-
nal FORTRAN code listing of the ATLAS model
and gave it to Van for CAA’s OR museum. Over
the years TCM/CEM went through three dif-
ferent name changes—they (Phil Louer and
Dr. Bruner) even had a contest for the name.
The model grew. In CEM’s early days Phil
Louer would ask me a question, and I could
always rattle off the answer. It’s amazing the
amount of code that you can store in your brain,
and somebody comes up and asks a question
and you just rattle it off. As CEM became more
complicated and everybody had become inti-
mately familiar with the model, their questions
were getting more finite in their detail. I remem-
ber not being able to answer a couple of ques-
tions one day and having to look at the code
to answer the question. Phil said something to
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Dr. Bruner about he didn’t know if I had the flu
or what, but that was the third time that day
I had to go look at the code. Bruner came in
and asked me if all was well. I said, ‘‘Yes, we’re
up to 20,000 lines of code, and I just don’t re-
call.’’ I said, ‘‘Secondly, Phil asked very detailed
questions, and you really have to go look at the
line of code to see which way it’s going.’’ The
funny part of this story is sometime later Wilbur
Payne called me. I think by then he’d gone over
to the Pentagon. He asked me something and
then he said, ‘‘What’s all this crap about you
having a limitation of 20,000 lines of code?’’
I thought what on earth is he talking about?
Then I remembered, so I think Bruner had men-
tioned it to him. [Laughs]
Bob Sheldon: What year did you start work-
ing on the conversion from TCM to CEM?
John Shepherd: TCM was 1967 or 1968. I had
taken a year at ISA, so let’s make it the start of
1967. In 1973, they changed the name to CEM.
Then in the middle 1970s, CAA changed the let-
ters in CEM to be something slightly different.
In the meantime, I’d been going to CAA almost
on a daily basis making coding changes for the
Heavy-Light study. Those of you who aren’t
old enough to remember, when Carter was
President, he (President Carter) went to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Mr. Kretschmann at OMB had decided with a
bunch of analysts that if you buy a swath of land
from the Baltics to the Alps five kilometers deep
and you put all these TOW (tube-launched,
optically-tracked, wire-guided) missiles in it
and you back it up with a ton of helicopters,
aircraft, and fortifications that no matter where
the Warsaw Pact attacks, you’ll be able to
fend them off. As a static indicator, it looked
good; but CEM said, ‘‘No.’’ CEM let the Soviets
probe in three areas, and wherever they broke
through, then CEM would reinforce this and
throw the reserves in. This is where CEM re-
ally began to grow. Later, Mr. Kretschmann
came to a meeting with the Army and after the
Army briefing on CEM results Mr. Kretschmann
said, ‘‘We got it wrong.’’ This meant OMB had
the wrong solution.
Bob Sheldon: Since you were there writing
the first lines of code for CEM, how rapidly
did that grow? You said it went up to 20,000
lines of code.
John Shepherd: First of all, there were several
people who preceded me with the early TCM
code. My job, upon returning to RAC, was to
get the code working and apply it to a notional
test study. Once we got it running, it was ap-
plied to a study and it grew fairly rapidly. As
you know with models, once you get a certain
portion of a model built, it begins to dictate
what you can do to it. It’s either that or go back
and make massive changes to code previously
written, which can really get to be complicated.
So at 20,000 lines, CEM really was telling you,
‘‘All your improvements have to fit what’s al-
ready here to some extent. You can’t really do
a lot that’s different.’’ I made one major change
which took me several months, and that was to
go from firepower scores to ATCAL (Attrition
Calibration) for attrition computations.
Bill Dunn:That was a pretty big improvement.
John Shepherd: It was a very big improve-
ment. Van and Phil Louer should be given credit
for that. From where I stood, Phil was the driv-
ing force for this calibration, and he got with
Alan Johnsrud, who was a physicist we had at
CAA. Alan started working on it, and then Phil
came to me. I’d just finished some other project
or was about to, and he said, ‘‘I want you to go
work with Dr. Johnsrud and see if we can get
this thing going.’’
I wrote the ATCAL code as a standalone
model, and I used CARMONETTE (it is the first
two syllables of the words Monte and Carlo, re-
versed with an ‘‘ette’’ added to represent small.
It was the first representation of a small unit
engagement using Monte Carlo techniques to
generate the interplay), one of the very high res-
olution models that we had, to calibrate it. In
other words, I’d get killer-victim scoreboards
from CARMONETTE for four or five variations
in the quantity of weapons on each side, and
then I would feed the killer-victim scores from
one of the CARMONETTE variations into what
was called Phase 1 of ATCAL—to calibrate
the differential equations; and then Phase 2,
given different variations in the weapon mix,
would compute the hits and the kills; and
then I would compare the ATCAL results with
the same run of weapon mixes run with the
CARMONETTE model.
Mike Garrambone: I went to CAA once to get
some weapon effectiveness data to run a model
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that I was using out in the desert. My question is
what motivated the change in schema? The sec-
ond part of that is where did you get the data
to run the new pieces? I mean, as you’re putting
code in there, you’re thinking, I need this to
make it happen. So first, what motivated the
change, and second, where were you thinking
you might get the data?
John Shepherd: I think the motivation came
from Phil Louer and/or Van, I don’t think either
of them liked firepower scores, and that’s all we
had. Firepower scores could not account for
kills and losses to specific systems and ATCAL
was developed to overcome this limitation. I
suspect knowing Phil and Van, they both had
probably been thinking for some time about
how to improve the validity of our attrition
computations. When Phil explained the process
to me, he said, ‘‘What we’re going to do is try to
drive it based on killer-victim scoreboards; in
other words, we’re going to have this real battle
that the Army’s going to actually simulate, or
we’re going to take historical data, or we’re go-
ing to take a high-resolution model, and we’re
going to generate killer-victim scores. From that,
we would like to calibrate the attrition based on
one battle and extrapolate to many different
weapon mixes in different battles.’’
Everybody who sat there that day—I’m
sure Johnsrud and I—probably thought this is
impossible. You just don’t take a single point
of data and extrapolate. But Johnsrud was very
good about the way he put the equations to-
gether and Phil had some good guidance for
Johnsrud. I’d like to tell you it worked the first
time, but I know you won’t believe it. Why it
worked was always a question in my mind be-
cause I played with the code and I’d go talk to
Johnsrud—he had moved to Mr. Vandiver’s of-
fice in the Pentagon, and I had to take the Metro
every morning to show him the results—these
were mainframe days. He would have ideas,
and I’d come back to CAA and change the code,
and then I’d show him some results the next day
and so forth and so on. This went on for weeks
with Phil Louer working with me every day. It
was Phil who suggested I take the exact weapon
mix that CARMONETTE had used to produce
the killer-victim scores and then see if ATCAL
would exactly produce the number of hits by
round type, by weapon type as CARMONETTE.
If ATCAL’s results exactly matched those of
CARMONETTE, then that was my first step in
saying, ‘‘Okay, ATCAL may be working.’’
Keep in mind, ATCAL was a series of
equations that were solved iteratively, where
the criteria for a solution was convergence,
i.e., the difference between the current iteration
solution and the previous iteration solution
must be less than some user-defined value.
Mike Garrambone: You were doing this in
FORTRAN?
John Shepherd: Yes. The second step was
to take a different weapon mix and feed it
into ATCAL Phase 2 and say, ‘‘Let’s get the
killer-victim scoreboards and the rounds fired
by shooter-target combinations, and then let’s
see if CARMONETTE comes out with the same
answer as ATCAL.’’ They were close—second
decimal place difference. I ran these tests on as
many mixes as I could; in fact, extreme mixes -
where I would multiply the number of red tanks
in a battle by a thousand over what I’d used to
calibrate the attrition algorithm and then com-
pare that with the same run in CARMONETTE,
and they were close.
Johnsrud gave briefings all over the US. The
Swedes came over; everybody came over. I re-
member briefing the Swedes on the code and
having to stop because somebody had to make
the translation between English and Swedish.
It worked, and then Phil Louer said to me,
‘‘Put it in CEM.’’
That took me a few months of rewriting ev-
erything in CEM. CEM’s estimation of the situ-
ation was based on force ratio which was based
on fire power scores. Needless to say the entire
CEM situation estimation and associated logic
all had to be redesigned and coded based on
ATCAL’s results.
Everyone uses ATCAL; the Air Force uses
some version of it in their theater model, and
I think TACWAR uses it. Over the years it’s
changed. I’m sure more talented people like
John Warren, Gerry Cooper, and others at CAA
have probably taken it apart and reworked it. I
know that because they came to me many years
ago and said, ‘‘Do you have any of your original
notes?’’ and I had notebook paper with penciled
notes—all I’d saved. These notes were copied by
everyone. Every time I turned around, some-
body was going through my notes.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. JOHN E. SHEPHERD
Page 142 Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012
It was Van and/or Phil Louer’s idea. Johnsrud
perfected it, and programmers, as usual, made
it work. I never thought Phil Louer or Van re-
ceived the credit they deserved.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you at RAC?
John Shepherd: Fifteen years.
Bob Sheldon: What other projects did you
work on at RAC?
John Shepherd: The Advice II model. That
took a year or two because they wargamed it
and constantly improved it; and it was much
better than the manual THEATERSPIEL and
TACSPIEL, which RAC was so famous for hav-
ing huge war rooms with three-dimensional
tables that eight or 10 colonels on each side
would play.
Dr. Herb Figgi and I—he was an MD—
wrote the software to determine the types of
tissue damage given certain velocities and mass
of bullets. That was interesting because the
computer would simulate the angle of entry
into the body and different conditions of the
tissue in terms of muscularity—this and that.
The model would then compute the probable
trajectories and collisions with body organs
and the energy dispersion. This was really the
early days of the M-16. It had a small projectile
but an extremely high muzzle velocity, and the
energy went up by the square or something with
the velocity. Our model simulated the energy
transfer to the tissue, and the tissue would break
down trying to absorb the energy. So the lethality
of the round could occur quite some distance
from the actual path of the projectile. You’d find
the liver or some other organ, just totally destroy-
ed—the tissue would break down and fall apart
as a function of energy absorption.
Bob Sheldon: Did you work on the SPIEL
models?
John Shepherd: No. The Advice II was really
intended to replace that. That (SPIEL) was labor
intensive. There were probably 20 or 30 people
in TACSPIEL and THEATERSPIEL in the war
rooms. Some of the retired colonels from World
War II, they were there, and some of them didn’t
like the computer. When people like me would
show up and watch what they were doing, they
felt threatened. I remember one guy saying to
me, ‘‘If we leave it to you guys, you’ll have to
have a book where we have to understand
things and do all this, and it has nothing to do
with military.’’ And I said, ‘‘You’re probably
right.’’
Bob Sheldon: When I interviewed Ed Kerlin
a few weeks ago, he talked about the SPIEL
models. Did you overlap with Ed at RAC?
John Shepherd: He was there and left to go
to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).
I did not know Ed until he went to IDA. I’d
heard his name, and I met him years later when
I was in J8. While working in J8 I had an office
at IDA, working on a model that IDA had de-
veloped called IDAGAM. IDA was another one
of the places where I was surrounded by great
talent.
Bill Dunn: It sounds like some of that
work might have been keying off of things
from the Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity (AMSAA). Did you work with those
guys or get information or data from them?
John Shepherd: I did go there and talk to
them, and yes, they did have data. I don’t recall
exactly who it was I spoke with up there.
Bill Dunn: It could have been Pete Reid.
John Shepherd: Yes, I remember Pete.
Bill Dunn: And there was another modeler
up there—Richard Sandmeyer.
John Shepherd: Yes, I remember him. I was
trying to think of the guy who headed up
AMSAA at the time.
Bill Dunn: Joe Sperrazza’s the first one that
I think of, but he was probably later.
John Shepherd: He came down. We gave him
a briefing, he and Herb Fallin. We had ATCAL
running, and he understood it. Herb and Phil
Louer got into a debate over something; I re-
member it was getting a little hostile when Jack
Newman or somebody said, ‘‘Why don’t we
take a ten-minute break?’’ You always hate this.
You’re the briefer, and two people at the con-
ference table—they’re the elephants; you’re just
a blade of grass—and they get into a debate in
front of you and you just stand there like well,
should I slowly disappear or go away before
they take it out on me?
Bob Sheldon: While you were at RAC, it
sounds like most of your travel was local in
the DC area. Did you have any data gathering
missions in Europe or anyplace else for loca-
tions you were modeling?
John Shepherd: Not that I was aware of. Phil
and Bruner gave me a magnetic tape—this is
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all before disk drives—with killer-victim
scoreboards on it to put in CEM. I ran it
through Phase 1 of ATCAL, and I was coming
up with probabilities of hit that were infinity.
What had happened was in our high-resolu-
tion model, we had killed weapons and never
fired a round at them. Glen Stockton headed
up the program. I went to Glen and said,
‘‘You guys have really got to go through this
model.’’ I said, ‘‘Look at all this stuff you’re
giving me on killer-victim scoreboards.’’ He
was pretty embarrassed; I guess they’d never
looked at all of it. But Phase I of ATCAL read
everything in and computed the probability
of kill (PK) based on the number of hits di-
vided by the number of rounds fired by
round type and shooter-target combination.
There was more than one instance where one
round had been fired and five weapons had
been killed or no rounds had been fired; and
of course, the computer dividing by zero gives
you infinity, and it gets an overflow, and it
caused some hiccups.
Bob Sheldon: Were you mostly modeling the
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ver-
sus Warsaw Pact Fulda Gap scenario?
John Shepherd: Yes, almost 100 percent of it
was CEM in those days, and all the data I re-
ceived was Fulda Gap and the Warsaw Pact ver-
sus NATO. The engagement ranges in the south
were so close because of the mountainous ter-
rain; you had battles down there, but they were
so small compared to the Fulda Gap where you
had these huge engagement ranges and much
larger forces.
Bill Dunn: I missed the timeframe for that
piece that you were just discussing. What era
were you looking at?
John Shepherd: This was probably middle-
1970s, 1975, 1976. General Research Corpora-
tion (GRC) had bought RAC in 1972, and I
was still a GRC employee for some period of
time on contract to CAA. Phil Louer, who had
gone to work for Abe Golub in the Pentagon,
called me at home one evening to tell me that
GEN Whitehead was going to try to convert
me over to a Seagull, they called it. The next
morning I received a call from—I think New-
man was the Deputy Director. Jack Newman
said, ‘‘Can you come and meet with GEN White-
head?’’ I did, and GEN Whitehead put his arm
around me and he said, ‘‘We want to convert you
to a Seagull.’’
He then went on to say, ‘‘Let me explain
what a Seagull is in case you missed the finer
points. It eats and shits, and it squawks, and
it’s protected by the federal government. There’s
a lieutenant colonel here, and he’s going to take
you down to Buzzard Point and swear you in.’’
And I said, ‘‘Shouldn’t I resign my other job?’’
He said, ‘‘I’ll take care of that this morning.’’
So I did. I went with the lieutenant colonel
to Buzzard Point and raised my right hand
and became a Seagull.
Bill Dunn: What was at Buzzard Point?
John Shepherd: The personnel office where
you were sworn in.
Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
John Shepherd: Between 1976 and 1978. I
don’t remember what year it was.
Bill Dunn: You were working in Bethesda
at the time?
John Shepherd: Yes, it had converted to CAA
from STAG by then. Jack Newman had been
my boss at RAC, and Jack left RAC to become
the technical director at STAG. Shortly there-
after the name was changed to CAA in 1973
(when CAA took over STAG), and GEN Hallgren
was the commanding general. I worked there
for a year or two, still under GRC auspices; on
contract. The whole thing started when I got
a call from Phil Louer—who worked for Abe
Golub—and he said, ‘‘Can you come to CAA
and help us modify CEM?’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I’m
in the middle of doing [whatever it was].’’
The next thing I know, my boss at RAC said,
‘‘No, you aren’t; you’re on contract to CAA.’’ I
went over to the Pentagon, and either GEN
Whitehead or Hallgren met me in the hall and
said, ‘‘This is what we want you to do.’’ Phil
came out and talked to me, and the following
day I went to CAA in Bethesda. That was, I
think, the Heavy-Light study. It had a lot of ur-
gency because President Carter was about to cut
the forces in NATO, buy real estate, and put in
a ‘‘Maginot Line.’’
Bill Dunn: During that era, Europe was the
main theater of interest. You never did any the-
ater support to Vietnam?
John Shepherd: No, I never did.
Mike Garrambone: Did you go to Germany
and walk the turf?
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. JOHN E. SHEPHERD
Page 144 Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012
John Shepherd: No, I was just a programmer,
a worker bee. We had people who did that and
came back and they wrote wonderful reports.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any anecdotes
about working with Wilbur Payne?
John Shepherd: First of all, I think he was
bored with life. In those days, we smoked and
he would come into my office in the morning
with his coffee and cigarette and we would sit
there and talk about CEM or something else.
He liked to play jokes on people, and every time
he came in I knew he had done something. One
of the things that he would do was take the cord
out of the base of the telephone, put scotch tape
over the contacts on it, and then plug it back in.
The phone would ring, but you couldn’t hear
or say anything into the handset. We’d sit there
and he would make a phone call to this person
whose phone he had rigged and we could hear
them in the hall saying, ‘‘Hello, hello, hello.’’
And Wilbur would just die laughing, and we
would laugh to the point tears would come
down our cheeks. This was just his mind wak-
ing up in the morning and coming in and hav-
ing fun.
Jack Newman called me in one morning
and said, ‘‘You are going to get in trouble. I
know Wilbur is up to no good and he is in your
office and he’s getting ready to pull another
practical joke on somebody.’’ He would take
the light table that people would look at for
view graphs and he would disconnect the bulbs
or connect them so they didn’t come on and
people would be down there trying to look at
their view graphs through the light table and
it wouldn’t work. We used blackboards with
chalk in those days. He would put lacquer, or
something, that dried quickly on the chalk. Peo-
ple would be trying to do things on their black-
boards and the white chalk wouldn’t rub off.
Or he would do things to erasers so that they
would cloud up the board. It was just Wilbur’s
way of having fun. I really enjoyed hanging
out with him.
When he left RAC, it is rumored that he
signed his resignation to Frank Parker (Presi-
dent of RAC) on toilet paper—but I don’t know
this to be a fact. He asked me to come with him
and I told him I just couldn’t stand the Pentagon.
I thought the offices were horrible and all he
wanted me to do was probably go to meetings.
I loved writing code and modeling and I just
couldn’t conceive of going over there.
Bob Sheldon: When you moved from RAC
and became a civil servant, did you stay work-
ing in the same office, same building?
John Shepherd: Pretty much same office,
same building. I had been there about a year
or two working for GRC under contract to
CAA and then when I became a civil servant
for the Army, I literally went back to work the
same day. I returned to RAC the following morn-
ing to clean out my office and General Schroeder
who was my boss (at RAC) was pretty upset
with me because he had heard that I was leav-
ing. I got a few things and said goodbye to
a few of my friends and that was it.
But same office, same phone number, and
I worked with the same people. Bill Allison
was a young major then; he was smart, caught
on to FORTRAN, and picked up CEM so quickly
he intimidated me. Ralph Johnson, our PhD
mathematician, did the same thing. Ralph
was a hard worker. You would have never
known him to have a PhD. He just rolled up
his sleeves and wrote code. What impressed
me about him was he had no ego problem.
He would bring his code in and he would say,
‘‘Go over this for me and let me know if I’ve
got this right.’’ He was that sort of worker.
Peggy Louden, a young lady who worked
with us on CEM, was very pregnant at the time
but was another dedicated, smart, hard worker.
Phil Louer was our group chief—he had a way
of making us all feel important and appreciated.
They were a fantastic group of people to work
with. Phil Louer had put together the best team
I have ever worked with.
Bob Sheldon: Did you ever take any com-
puter programming courses?
John Shepherd: I probably did. I don’t re-
member.
Bob Sheldon: So you more or less taught
yourself about computers?
John Shepherd: The computer languages I
seemed to pick up. Gerry Cooper observed this
at RAC many years ago. I have forgotten what
the language was but it was probably under
the Control Data Corporation (CDC) 1700. He
said one day to Dr. Tiede, ‘‘I have watched John
and he picks up languages very fast.’’ Part of
that is due to experience. My first language
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was assembly language. You understand
pretty much how the computer works at that
level. Then I moved to FORTRAN. Most lan-
guages aren’t that different. I say that because
I probably wrote C11 but I really wrote FOR-
TRAN in C11. I think your first language
tends to have great influence on the new lan-
guages you pick up or at least how you apply
them.
The last simulation I worked on, the Explor-
atory Regional Insurgency Simulation (ERIS),
was an insurgency-counterinsurgency simula-
tion for CAA. I wrote that in VBA (Visual Basic
Applications) which is not the same as Visual
Basic. Karsten Engelmann gave me a book on
VBA. I talked to John Warren. I said, ‘‘If you
use VBA, what are the pitfalls?’’ In five minutes,
John knew me well enough to explain to me this
is how you would normally do it but you can’t
do it this way in VBA. He went through four
or five examples. As I wrote 18,000 lines of code
over the next two years for ERIS, those were ex-
actly the pitfalls that I would have fallen into.
John Warren knew me that well.
I pick up languages fairly fast but I probably
program in that language just as if I were in
FORTRAN. There are exceptions: Smalltalk and
the Joint Warfare Simulation (JWARS). The pre-
cedence is completely different in Smalltalk
than all the other languages. Keywords are a
number one priority in Smalltalk and you have
a list of keywords that Smalltalk can recognize
and you can create keywords. But you had to
be careful. When you go through Smalltalk
code, it isn’t what’s in the parentheses so much
as whether or not there is a keyword there.
And then the hierarchy falls into whether it’s
a multiplication, etc.
When I programmed in Smalltalk, I used
a lot of parentheses because I knew the compiler
would solve for everything inside the innermost
parentheses before it went to the next outer pa-
rentheses. I could force that compiler to gener-
ate the code the way I wanted it executed. I just
enjoy computer languages.
Bob Sheldon: What were some of your other
projects at CAA?
John Shepherd: CEM, ATCAL, and then I got
into parallel and distributed processing. This
was a project that Gerry Cooper had started
with Bob Orlov. Bob had left CAA to go to J8. I
have forgotten who it was—maybe Mr. Hollis—
said you need to take this over. So I flew out
to California to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) to talk to the people about parallel process-
ing. I had a tremendous teacher out there who is
now here in the local area—Fred Wieland who
finished his doctorate at George Mason Univer-
sity in OR. Fred was a young guy at JPL at the
time. Professor David Jefferson had conceptu-
alized something called the Time Warp Operat-
ing System, which allowed simulated events
to be executed on separate processors while
maintaining synchronized timing among the
events.
Bob Sheldon: What year were you studying
parallel processing?
John Shepherd: This was in the late 1980s,
early 1990s. This was completely different be-
cause now we had instead of one processor
and everything executing in sequence, we could
have 1,000 processors with things executing
in parallel and some events of the simulation
could get ahead of other events executed on
other processors in terms of simulation time.
If the simulation detected an event that would
influence a previously executed event on an-
other processor, it would roll back the pre-
viously executed event and recompute its
results. That’s about as far as we want to go.
Dr. Jefferson had conceptualized Time
Warp. I think Dr. Reynolds at the University of
Virginia (UVA) was working with it. Richard
Fujimoto worked at JPL and then Richard went
down to Georgia Tech and I think is still there.
Just a lot of brilliant people. I had the good for-
tune to work with some of the finest minds in
the world.
Bob Sheldon: Did you put this on a Cray
supercomputer or some other kind of parallel
processor?
John Shepherd: Actually, we had a parallel
processor at JPL, the name of which escapes
me. It had 32 processors and we had a portion
of the simulation running. It was running rather
well and the speed up curve where the X-axis is
time and the Y-axis is the speed up was just
about a 45 degree line up to a point and then it
went flat.
It was all done in C11 and we created
small objects that talk to each other a great deal.
Once we had results to look at we found that
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small objects tightly coupled (sending each
other a lot of messages) wasn’t the way to do
it. Rather, the best approach was to have larger
objects that didn’t talk to each other as often
and try to collocate objects that did interact with
each other on the same processor—which may
not be feasible or cause other timing problems.
So we were constantly having to synchronize
these processors with these objects talking to
one another. I remember briefing Mr. Hollis
and saying I just blew a lot of your money last
year, and we have to go back and re-code it so
that instead of an object being a tank, these ob-
jects are now companies and battalions. In those
days you smoked. I remember to this day he
took his little cigar out of the corner of his mouth
and said, ‘‘John, somebody has to be first; go
on.’’ [Laughter] He is on my very short list of
heroes.
One night I found, through a mutual friend,
that the Air Force had an intelligence center
not far from Los Angeles. I had a phone num-
ber for an Air Force colonel and I called him
and told him who I was and what I wanted to
do. I said, ‘‘If I get Mr. Hollis to call you, could
we borrow your parallel processor (which
had 1,000 processors on it)?’’ He called me
back about an hour later and he said, ‘‘When
can you come over?’’ I said, ‘‘At your conve-
nience.’’ He said, ‘‘Can you do it in an hour?’’
I said, ‘‘I don’t know, we will try.’’ If we get
a ticket, we will get a ticket because we were
at JPL’s lab in Pasadena and he was on the
other side of town.
We drove over and he let us use their paral-
lel processing computer. We knew then, I think
we ran it with 500 processors; the speed just
kept going at a 45 degree angle. We owe the
Air Force for that one; and no charge.
We gave briefings on Time Warp. Lots
of people attended. We gave papers at West
Point—standing room only. People sat in the
aisles. It was the same at the Naval Academy.
Fred Wieland and I gave four or five papers at
both academies during MORSS.
Bob Sheldon: A specific issue that comes up
in parallel processing: there are some prob-
lems you can parallelize and divide the problem
into pieces and then put them back together
again. Other problems, you can’t parallelize.
How did you tackle those kinds of issues?
John Shepherd: Time Warp took care of some
of this. Time Warp took care of any synchronous
message passing between objects, and what I’m
saying is they were not synchronized. An object
moved across a bridge and it then continues to
maneuver on processor A. Well, what about
processor B, where an aircraft attacks and de-
stroys a bridge sometime before the other object
has crossed it, but after processor A had exe-
cuted the bridge crossing? Time Warp would
detect this and it would roll that (event); the
tank crossing the bridge (notionally speaking)
and now it would say the bridge is gone and
the tank is prohibited from crossing the
bridge—it would cancel the bridge crossing.
Time Warp took care of all of this sort of asyn-
chronous timing of events—but at a cost in
terms of running/execution time.
If you were totally oblivious to Time Warp
and parallel processing, i.e., you coded it as
you would normally code, your simulation
would probably run slower than if you knew
you were going to have to simulate events that
were synchronized. For example, let’s put all
the tanks and aircraft that are in one portion of
the theater on the same processor. I have a sub-
marine that’s located in the Gulf running on
the same processor that the tanks are on in the
western portion of the desert. They are going
to have events that don’t influence each other.
So you had to think a little bit about your sce-
nario, try to assign your objects to the processors
in such a way that when you put an object on a
processor, most of the object’s interactions with
other objects occur on that processor. Now,
that’s within limits; we would break it down
into finer granularity. Things that were in the
northeast portion of the theater might be on
a processor. The northwest portion might be
on another processor. We knew they were going
to overlap and influence each other but perhaps
not as much. Sometimes we would make sev-
eral runs and adjust which objects were simu-
lated on which processor. Also, one must try
to balance the amount of executed instructions
on each processor—load balancing. If one of
the processors has more instructions (events)
to execute than the others, it may lag behind
the others in simulation time—the keyword is,
‘‘may.’’ The art was not well understood and
will vary by scenario.
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Bob Sheldon: Were you running a model that
copied the algorithms from CEM to put in this
parallel processor, or did you create new algo-
rithms for that?
John Shepherd: As I recall we did use ATCAL
for attrition computations. The rest of the model
was based on new design and code. We could go
down to the individual tank.
Bob Sheldon: What was the model called?
John Shepherd: The simulation under devel-
opment using Time Warp was called CTLS,
Concurrent Theater Level Simulation.
Bob Sheldon: Was it used for any major
studies?
John Shepherd: No. When Bill Lese was get-
ting ready to put JWARS together, we talked
about CTLS and CTLS was just too esoteric in
Bill’s opinion, and I think he was correct. It
was doubtful you could turn it over to a normal
OR group and expect them to effectively use it.
It was a university thing that people wrote PhD
papers, and tried to improve on but it requires
some understanding of what you were doing.
Bill Dunn: From CAA, how did you end up
working with Bill Lese?
John Shepherd: I gave a paper at MORSS
at the Air Force Academy and was in the Acad-
emy library doing something and Bill came in
and introduced himself. He said, ‘‘I’d like to
have you come to work for me.’’ I just liked
him. He had a nice way about him. I went to the
Pentagon and interviewed. They asked good
questions. The person who talked to me about
linear programming, he was an Air Force colo-
nel, asked good questions. It was the first time
somebody other than Gerry Cooper had really
gotten down into that level of linear program-
ming. There were others in the room, Vince
Roske was there and a couple other colonels.
I was impressed with all of them.
I said, ‘‘Let me think about it.’’ As you
know, Bill can be very persuasive. He called
the house and talked to my wife. She said, ‘‘I re-
ally like him.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, he is just very per-
suasive.’’ So I went to work for him.
I had no idea what a Form 9 was but my
first job was to put together a Form 9 so that
some world leader would be uninvited from
General Vessey’s retirement ceremony. I said,
‘‘You’re kidding. I don’t do that. You don’t want
to know the derivative of X to the N or N times
X to the N minus 1 or something like that?’’ He
said, ‘‘No.’’
I lived on the phone. Bill made me Secretary
to the Defense Science Council group (consist-
ing of senior scientists from the four services,
with Mr. Hollis as the Army rep and Bill Lese
as its chair). This meant I had to get all of these
important people to one place at one time,
which was incredibly difficult. I must have
smoked a pack of cigarettes a day. My day be-
gan at 6:30 in the morning when Bill came in.
One night I couldn’t get home. The Metro had
stopped running at 11:00 p.m. and I didn’t
know that, so I had to take a cab home.
I told Bill the next day, two things are
wrong. One, the finance people owe me for
about 15 trips. My wife said there are few peo-
ple who can afford your job because I think at
that time they owed me like $18,000. And I have
got to have a place to park. I can’t stay in here
until 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 a.m. and find a way
home. Typical Bill, he called somebody by the
name of Kay and said, ‘‘I want him put on Se-
nior Executive Service (SES) travel status and
I want an SES parking place for him.’’
The first thing that happened was I tried to
park in the assigned parking slot and an Air
Force colonel was already there and I said,
‘‘I think this is my parking place.’’ On the days
I didn’t use it I would call the Air Force colonel
and say, ‘‘I’m going to be out of town for the
next five days.’’ The colonel would come by
my office and I would give him a little thing
to stick in the slots in order to get up to the river
entrance. He was pretty good about it.
But that was working for Bill. I lost 15
pounds. I lived out of a suitcase.
Bob Sheldon: What other kinds of projects
did you work on?
John Shepherd: It was everything. It was
issues. General Mahaffey served as Com-
mander in Chief of US Readiness Command
(REDCOM). He wanted to do certain things
so he sent a back channel message to General
Vessey. I guess the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) didn’t really want to do what Gen-
eral Mahaffey wanted so I got the job to go
down and talk to General Mahaffey in Florida
and tell him, ‘‘This isn’t going to really work.’’
Why they didn’t tell him themselves, I don’t
know.
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So, I flew down to Tampa and Mahaffey
wasn’t there. I turned the rental car in and went
back to Washington. Admiral Carter, Director of
the Joint Staff, said you need to go back down
there. Mahaffey is there and wants to see you.
So I went back to National Airport and went back
to Tampa and the lady at the car rental place said,
‘‘Didn’t you just turn this car in?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes
ma’am.’’ I drove back out to the base and the
guard looked at me like, ‘‘Didn’t you just leave?’’
That was my life. I just walked around with
my briefcase and my suitcase and I used the
BOQ (Bachelor Officers Quarters) laundry to
get my laundry done. I would call my wife
and I would say, ‘‘I’m at Fort Lewis, Washington
and I will see you when I see you.’’ You have
been there—you know the feeling. But if you
worked in staff positions, you really didn’t
write any code. You just did what they told
you to do which was to simply go do this, go
talk to this person, attend this meeting.
Bob Sheldon: How long did you stay there?
John Shepherd: I was there 18 months. Bill
had gone to CENTCOM in Tampa, and Mary
Ina didn’t want to go even though they had
a nice CIA position for her. She wanted to stay
here. I had drifted off into JSOA, the Joint Spe-
cial Operations Agency, doing a few things and
figured this probably isn’t me. I called Mr.
Vandiver or Phil Louer and said, ‘‘I’m going to
look around.’’ One of them said, ‘‘Can you be
here Monday?’’ and I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ By then we
had another general that headed up J8—Joe
Rigby. I just told him, ‘‘I’m leaving.’’
I left and went back to CAA the following
Monday and reported in. J8 was good experi-
ence but staff jobs will kill you.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you go back to
CAA?
John Shepherd: Whenever Bill left to go to
Tampa—around 1986. I remember I had talked
to Van and Phil that morning about returning
to CAA and within 20 minutes, the phone rang
and it was Bill Lese from Tampa saying,
‘‘What’s wrong?’’ I thought, ‘‘Do you have mi-
crophones on everyone’s desk?’’
Bob Sheldon: CAA was still in Bethesda
when you went back?
John Shepherd: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: What tasks did you go back to
at CAA?
John Shepherd: It may have been working
with the parallel processing which really would
have probably put it in 1989 or 1990. Shortly
after I returned to CAA, Bob Orlov left and
went to J8. I’m not sure but Bob may have taken
the position I had in J8. He or Pete Byrne, they
both left about the same time from CAA to go
to J8. J8 was a real experience. What day is it
and what airport am I in?
Bob Sheldon: Any new model developments
in CAA that you worked on?
John Shepherd: The parallel processing—and
then I got with the Institute of Land Warfare
people at Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) who were working on the Theater
Exploitation Study System (TESS) at Skyline
Towers in Falls Church, Virginia. They had
spent a lot of money on it and Mr. Hollis had
asked Pete Reid to head up a panel to take a look
at it. They had hardwired some code so you re-
ally couldn’t change the tactics and do things.
After the Reid panel completed their investiga-
tion, Mr. Hollis decided to merge TESS with
CTLS to form the Advanced Regional Explor-
atory System (ARES).
We then decided to have PRC help us merge
the simulations. I think that was done in C11.
I was not popular because any time you take
a model apart, there are a lot of people that have
a lot of effort in that code and it’s easy to go in
and find faults. But I presented a case to PRC
where they recognized that we needed to simu-
late tactics as well as weapons; we just couldn’t
say to the model, ‘‘Do this and do that.’’ I had
a way of doing it and they agreed.
I worked with Berlin Lewis, who was an
INSCOM analyst. Scott Bergman was the head
civilian employee. A lot of trips to the West
Coast to PRC’s office; coming back here, getting
that code to run on a computer here that wasn’t
a Control Data 6600 which they had developed
TESS for. PCs (personal computers) were com-
ing into existence by then, so we needed to have
it running on a PC which meant some signifi-
cant code changes.
Bob Sheldon: Were you still doing the Fulda
Gap scenario?
John Shepherd: No. It was Desert Storm, be-
cause I gave a paper at the Naval Academy
and I had invented this scenario. I had never
attended a briefing on Desert Storm just to make
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. JOHN E. SHEPHERD
Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012 Page 149
sure we weren’t contaminated. I got called on
the carpet after the briefing that it was identical
to the Hail Mary that was going to take place
but had not taken place yet. Some of the view
graphs were actually taken from me by an
Army major. Dr. Griff Callahan came to my res-
cue. He said, ‘‘I know this guy, he wouldn’t do
that. He would be very cautious.’’ I thought for
a moment I was in serious trouble. Callahan
was a retired colonel that worked at Georgia
Tech. Nice guy. He just happened to overhear
the conversation and immediately vouched
for me.
Bob Sheldon: Was this a MORS symposium
you were at?
John Shepherd: Yes. It had to do at that point
in time with a little mixture of parallel pro-
cessing and just a standard sequential process-
ing. The unfortunate thing is there were a few
people there who really understood parallel
processing and they were asking a lot of ques-
tions. I think 90 percent of the audience was like,
‘‘What in the hell are they talking about?’’ I real-
ized then, don’t mix these briefings. Don’t bring
in parallel processing and asynchronous mes-
sage passing and all these things that make
you sound smart. Throw that in the trashcan
and let’s just talk about the model and talk
about the scenario and the results.
All of a sudden INSCOM and Mr. Hollis
decided that they would go with JWARS. Bill
Lese had been a good politician and I was tap-
ped to go over and be the technical director
under Jim Metzger. That was fine. I had an office
in the Pentagon and broke my right wrist while
building a deck on the back of my house. I was
running around in my cast and trying to learn
to use a mouse with my left arm which had 10
screws and a plate trying to hold it together.
Metzger and I had worked together before
at CAA. When I got over there, I think I was
tainted in my attitude a little bit toward him.
Things didn’t get any better. After a couple of
months I just told Bill Lese, ‘‘No thank you.’’ I
went to talk to Mr. Hollis; Hollis said, ‘‘Will
you do this for me?’’ That’s hard to turn down
because he is one of my heroes. I went back
for another month and I finally just said, ‘‘No.’’
I hated to disappoint him.
I went back to CAA. About two years later
we moved from Bethesda to Fort Belvoir. Colonel
Andy Loerch came to me and said, ‘‘We are hav-
ing some meetings over in Rosslyn, Virginia, on
JWARS and we would like to have you attend
to have you technically separate whatever is
going on from whatever is really going on.’’
Wally Chandler was my boss and I said to
Wally, ‘‘I don’t want to go over there.’’ Wally
said, ‘‘Just go to a couple of meetings.’’
This evolved over the next couple of
months. The meeting frequency increased from
one or two days a week to five days a week. Mr.
Hollis said, ‘‘I really need you to work at
the JWARS office in Rosslyn. You don’t have to
put up with anything. You are the Army repre-
sentative. If somebody says something to you
that you don’t like, tell them you represent
me.’’ I said, ‘‘Okay’’ and Van asked if I would
go. I said, ‘‘Yes, I will try it.’’ And I went. Jim
was very cooperative and so was everyone else.
There were a lot of contractors. I was the Army
guy. Commander Boots Barnes was from the
Navy. The Air Force was represented by Lt Col
Greg McIntyre, a really smart guy. He had a
PhD. And the Marine Corps sent a guy, Steve
Stephens, who was sharp. The contractors were
really good. I had never used Smalltalk, just
learned it and worked in the vault in Rosslyn
and was in the vaults when 9/11 occurred. I went
out of the vault and looked out the window and
the Pentagon was on fire. By then there were
400,000 or 500,000 lines of code in JWARS. I
focused on the land portion, a little bit on air
because they were kind of mixed. I stayed there
five years.
Then I got a call one morning and Van said,
‘‘All is forgiven. Why don’t you come home?’’
I said, ‘‘I think I’m just going to retire. Some
of our investments had paid off extremely
well.’’ We had bought land in Fairfax when in
the 1960s you could afford to buy a little bit,
and we still had it. The kids were out of school.
Van said, ‘‘No, I want you to come back.’’ Then
Mr. Hollis called and said, ‘‘I want you to think
about insurgency and what could we do in
counterinsurgency.’’ That was how I spent the
next four or five years. So I ended 50 years
of programming on a very high note: writing
code, doing something I loved, and building
a model. It ran. I was very proud of it. It’s where
entities talk to one another and influence one
another’s attitude toward the government and
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. JOHN E. SHEPHERD
Page 150 Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012
the insurgent, as may be influenced by barriers,
religions, politics, and ethnicities.
Bob Sheldon: What language was that writ-
ten in?
John Shepherd: That was in VBA because it
comes with Microsoft Office. If you have Excel,
you have VBA. It’s a very easy language to use.
There were a few things that none of the books
talked about that I wanted to do. For example,
I wanted to pause the model and then go into
the input data and make changes or draw graphs
from the output and see how events and entity
attitudes were changing. It turned out the operat-
ing system wouldn’t let me do that. As soon as
I would pause the model and drag it off to the
side of the screen and click into the Excel spread-
sheet, Excel would abort. Everyone I talked to
said, ‘‘No, you can’t do that. You are jumping
between two levels of the operating system and
Excel will not let you do that.’’
There are discussion groups on the Internet.
Some are good, some are bad. I put out an
e-mail and said, ‘‘This is what I’m trying to
do. Does anyone have any suggestions?’’ I got
tons of e-mails back. I even got one from Micro-
soft saying, ‘‘We’re going to bring this up at the
next standards committee.’’ But I received one
e-mail from a person in Crystal City who said,
‘‘I think I know how to do this.’’ It turned out
he worked with a bunch of guys that I had
worked with on JWARS and he said, ‘‘Every-
body over here knows you so if you will come
over here and buy coffee one morning, I will try
to find out how to do this.’’ I said, ‘‘You got
a deal.’’
I went over one morning, grabbed a half
dozen doughnuts and went upstairs and got
into a room and sure enough, everybody in
there was the old JWARS crowd which they
then called the Joint Analysis System (JAS). This
one person was hacking away at his computer
terminal, four or five of us were standing around
talking when this person smacks his hands to-
gether and claps and says, ‘‘That’s it.’’ Four or
five of us ran over to his terminal and looked
over his shoulder. There is a switch you could
set to ‘‘ignore’’ which allows you to jump back
and forth and in and out of your Excel spread-
sheet while you were executing your model.
I went back to CAA and set the switch - and I
could pause the model, go in and change things,
draw graphs, change data, and then restart the
model. From that point you could run ERIS for
a day or two, a week, or six months, then pause
it, review the output, make changes to the in-
put, restart the model at that point in simula-
tion time and repeat the process as often as
you liked.
I worked on things like how to make
screens go away. You would have a screen full
of something and you would say, ‘‘I want to do
this now so I need a different screen.’’ Well,
how do you get the current screen to go away?
I couldn’t find anyone, even on the Internet,
who knew how to do that. So I said to myself,
‘‘The screen is an object, and it’s got a page
and behaviors, and behaviors have attributes.’’
So I broke it down into an object-oriented type
fashion. There were two attributes that I had
seen which hinted at this. One was visibility—
could be true or false—and the other was active
or inactive.
After about an hour of hacking away at it,
I got the screen to go away and another one to
come up. I don’t know that this is supported
by Microsoft, but I sent them an email and I said,
‘‘You really need to document how to do this.’’
I never got a response back. But it works. So
part of programming is to figure out things
the books don’t tell you.
Bob Sheldon: One of the challenges in our
business is for people who understand the
phenomenology of warfare to communicate
with computer programmers who write pro-
grams to simulate it, so you get good verifica-
tion and validation of the simulation. What
are your thoughts on that?
John Shepherd: I agree and I have had many
embarrassing moments. Julian Ewell, a retired
lieutenant general, explained to me how counter-
battery fire worked, converting direct support
(DS) artillery to general support (GS) and using
it to suppress the other side’s DS and/or GS
artillery.
He explained it quite well on the black-
board, and I thought I understood it so I wrote
all the code. I ran it that night and much to my
surprise both sides had converted all of their
artillery to GS, and all the artillery were shoot-
ing at each other’s artillery and there was no
DS artillery. It was all counter-battery fire. So
I thought well, I didn’t understand General
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Ewell’s explanation very well. I had Phil Louer
and General Ewell come in and say, ‘‘This is
what you did wrong.’’ Are there limits? And
what is the logic an artillery or a brigade com-
mander or division commander uses to de-
termine how much artillery is suppressed
opposing direct fire and indirect fire weapons?
They explained to me, it depended on how much
direct fire was occurring, how many losses you
were getting, how much close air support you
had, in order to determine how much you would
suppress.
Bob Sheldon: Give us some of the high points
of your career.
John Shepherd: Another high point in my ca-
reer, I worked at MITRE on a rotational assign-
ment for a year. I worked for a retired General
Bill Tidwell. I liked him.
Bob Sheldon: What was his function?
John Shepherd: During the Vietnam War, he
had been head of overhead systems or some-
thing like that. When I worked for him he was
a division chief at MITRE.
Bob Sheldon: Is that while you were working
for RAC that you were on rotation?
John Shepherd: Yes, you could take these ro-
tations and while at MITRE, I shared an office
with Dr. Max Oldham. Max had been head of
ORD (the Office of Research and Development)
for the CIA and had retired. We were doing op-
timal locations of ground sensors and Max had
all the theory and I had to solve all the equations
and program the computer to notionally, incre-
mentally, move these sensors to different places
to get the maximum coverage for different ter-
rains and different theaters. It was a nice job.
I liked it. I liked working for Max. In fact, Phil
Louer called one day to ask me something and
I said, ‘‘I am working with your old boss.’’ It
turned out that Max had been Phil’s boss so they
talked on the phone a while. It is a small world,
really.
I was there about a year. Nothing of any
great consequence. I didn’t care for MITRE that
much. Management was very straight-laced,
very structured. Tidwell was a nice guy; I liked
him. I think he was putting in a vineyard down
on the Northern neck or something at that time
which I had thought about doing. I had sub-
scribed to some viticulture newspapers and
magazines. He and I talked a bit about that.
I left there and went back to RAC or
GRC, whatever it was called at that time.
RAC was the kind of place where they encour-
aged you to go off to school for a year or
two, go to another company if you wanted,
or go to the government. I was at ISA when
Newman called and said we are going to
build TCM and we’ve got to get you back here.
They had started it and people had failed.
I guess somebody had said that you have
got to get Shepherd. He’s dumb enough to
do anything.
Bob Sheldon: It used to be that the services
had their own civil servants and officers who
wrote computer code. Nowadays, almost all of
the code is written by contractors, and the ser-
vices have people to provide oversight. What
is your opinion about that?
John Shepherd: I agree. First of all, private in-
dustry tends to pick up people who are very
current in their education on programming lan-
guages and on computers.
Second, you really do have to invest in your
government people in order to make sure that
what the contractor is selling you is what in fact
you wanted and are paying for. A classic exam-
ple was JWARS. When I started to go through
the code, I put in what are called breakpoints
that allowed me to watch the code execute, par-
ticularly for the land warfare. Very early on I
found that a subscript in an array was not being
incremented, and I went across the street to an-
other office and the programmer over there was
a very nice guy. I said, ‘‘I’m either reading this
wrong or here is what’s happening.’’ I showed
him the printout. He said, ‘‘Oh my God.’’ He
went through the code and he said, ‘‘You are
right.’’ In my opinion, somebody from the gov-
ernment has to go down and do those sorts
of really trigger-pulling type exercises. I found
the AH-64 was engaging targets at 5 km, and I
could not find in the data structure where to
change that. Their Hellfire will do it but the
chain gun isn’t going to reach out 5 km and
annihilate targets.
I went through the code and it turned out
that there is only one parameter in JWARS for
the engagement range of the AH264, and that
is for all weapons on the AH264. So I went to
the programmer and I said, ‘‘We can’t live with
this. If we live with this, we will just buy chain
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guns. We will stick three or four in an AH-64
and take over the battlefield.’’
I think over time, I had about two pages
of things I thought were really wrong. And
things that sneak up and bite you that really
aren’t the programmer’s fault. If I changed the
random number seed, I could find places where
aircraft were engaged by a surface-to-air sys-
tem. But if I changed the seed, in the next run
they weren’t. It depended on the sequence of
events that occurred. For a discrete event model,
I don’t think this should occur. Just too much
can change because if you shoot down the air-
craft, the aircraft then don’t do their missions
and then you say, ‘‘This will average out statis-
tically.’’ Well, maybe it does, maybe it doesn’t.
But then that event changes the next seed
for a subsequent event; whether or not the sub-
marine in the straits was detected. And then it’s
detected in another run and it gets torpedoed
or it is sunk and it’s all because the sequence
of random number seeds. My theory was, I wrote
a short paper, events in some portion of the
battlefield ought to have their own random
number generator. Submarines in the straits
that are located 500 miles away shouldn’t be
dependent upon an event that occurs in the
western portion of the theater for aircraft be-
ing engaged by air defense systems. And this
is the government and contractor’s responsi-
bility. It’s not sloppy programming; it’s just
something somebody didn’t detect.
Bob Sheldon: Any other topics that I should
have asked you about?
John Shepherd: There was a study I worked
on, I think it was sometime in the late 1960s.
We had the riots in all the cities and somehow
I got asked to participate with this federal task
force to take a look at them and see what we
could do for the police department. RAC had
quite a bit of Army money that they could
channel into different things that had to do
with public safety. A fellow by the name of
Dick Longmire at RAC had written a proposal
and we had gotten this money.
Dick and I flew to various cities where they
had riots and tried to come away with some
assessment as to what the government could
do to help. One of the things was of course re-
gional communications—police and fire depart-
ments with regional communication capability.
We also noted that the fires in Newark had only
the Newark Fire Department which was just
simply not up to responding to many different
places in the city simultaneously.
We found one fire department who had
come in from a surrounding town and who in
our opinion had fought a key fire and had sub-
dued it. We interviewed the Fire Chief of that
volunteer fire department and asked, ‘‘Why did
you go there? Did anybody tell you to go there?’’
And he said, ‘‘No, we were just driving down
the street, and we saw the fire so we turned
down there and fought it.’’
Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
John Shepherd: That was late 1960s. We got
to Chicago and we were assured that Chicago
had a very secure communication system with
unknown frequencies on certain walkie-talkies
and we were shown the intelligence center
where the secret frequencies were being moni-
tored. Suddenly we heard music coming in
over one of the secure radios. It turned out in
questioning the chief that someone had stolen
a walkie-talkie out of one of the cruisers and
they didn’t know what they had but they were
playing music over it.
There were things like this that surfaced.
We needed encryption for certain things and
digital was just coming along. Beam antennas,
I was a ham operator, so I could talk to them
about the RF signal envelope that antennas pro-
duce and how to direct it and try to keep it
from radiating 360 degrees or even 180 degrees.
That grew into an algorithm to take the
data from the cities and rank the relative im-
portance of each of those cities and different
places in terms of the payoff to the terrorists
who might want to bomb and do things to them
vs. the risk of being caught or failure. If the terror-
ist fails, the government PR (public relations) is
good. It shows the government is doing its job
and the terrorist is not. If on the other hand the ter-
rorist succeeds, the public becomes alarmed, par-
ticularly if there is collateral damage of civilians.
Bill Dunn: Did that get put into practice?
John Shepherd: Yes it did. Fairfax County was
one of the first I worked with then. Chief Durr
and Captain or Lt Columbus (I actually remem-
ber their names) and Major or Captain Dottson
who was head of intelligence then. We started
putting in a whole new system of radios, a very
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expensive system with repeaters around the
county. There are dead spots for communica-
tions. It’s just one of the geophysical phenom-
ena in communications when you rely on FM
particularly. Towers were put up or we rented
space on tops of buildings.
In these repeaters, the early days before cell
phones, we would pick up the signal and
retransmit it and this is how a cruiser with
maybe 15 watts of RF (radio frequency) power
out could talk to somebody in Woodbridge
from Centreville.
We also told them they had to secure these
systems. One of my jobs was to determine the
vulnerability of targets in Washington and I
actually had a letter on me that said if I am
arrested, you are to call this number. I purchased
maps from various federal agencies showing the
location of all communication towers and public
water systems and you name it. We gave a brief-
ing to the Provost Marshal of the Army about
this, and I remember he was ill at the very
thought of the study results ever being made
public and he classified everything. So Fairfax
was the first. I think we then went into Arlington
and Alexandria and put everybody on the same
metro frequencies, and then Maryland began to
pick up.
We found problems. For example, let’s say
there was a problem in Baltimore. The governor
of Maryland at that time was a different politi-
cal party than the mayor of Baltimore and if
one declared a state of emergency and called
out the National Guard, this was an admission
that political parties had failed. There was
some disconnect as to who was in charge and
who was going to declare what. This was not
just Baltimore, it was other cities. Somebody
had to set up a hierarchy and make these deci-
sions to be responsible. The riots produced
some good government changes.
Another thing. I applied the use of linear
programming (LP) to determine, based on the
aircraft and the type of target, the optimal mix
of fins, fuzes, and ordinance on board aircraft
carriers. This linear program was put on board
ships and it automatically ordered things that
it would predict shortages of. It automatically
looked at different targets and sorties that
you are planning down the road. It looked
at the inventory and did all this stuff. That
was interesting.
Bob Sheldon: Was that for the Navy?
John Shepherd: Yes, that was for the Navy.
Other than having to get my budget ap-
proved for my parallel processing and whatnot,
times were good. You (Bill Dunn) and Gene
Visco and everybody else down there, I think I
submitted monthly reports and purposely wrote
them so that nobody would understand them.
[Laughter]
Bill Dunn: We actually read them.
John Shepherd: I didn’t think there were more
than a dozen people on the East Coast or West
Coast who understood what we were doing.
Mr. Hollis would ask good questions; he im-
pressed me more than once with real insight into
things.
Bill Dunn: We kept expecting this massively
parallel technology was going to provide a big
breakthrough, but it never did quite get to full-
scale production.
John Shepherd: I think what happened was
the advent of the PC. The speed at which the
PC evolved over a very short period of time,
probably two or three years, just simply made
parallel processing inappropriate for simula-
tions. It was esoteric. You had to understand
it. If you wrote straight code and didn’t keep
an eye on the fact that you had to have things
(objects) that were going to talk to each other
a great deal, that interact with each other, lo-
cated on the same processor, it didn’t run much
faster than on a single processor. When you
compared the speed with the PC as it evolved,
for $500 or $600, I have a computer at home that
just simply today outruns anything I grew up
with. STAG paid $7 million for that IBM 7090
in 1961 and my home PC is 1 million times faster
and more capable.
I think Mr. Hollis had the right idea. It’s just
that the technology overtook the idea because
up to that point in time, we were getting one
run a day on CEM and the other models and
we couldn’t live with that.
If I were to summarize, I’d say I had the best
job in the world, working for and with the best
people on the planet.
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